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Dr. Hugh Kendrick, Vice President 
Science Applications, Inc.
1710 Goodridge Drive 
McLean, Virginia 22102
ABSTRACT
The strategic importance of nuclear power lies 
in its contribution to: expanding electricity 
supplies essential to economic growth; assuring 
the nation's orderly transition from insecure 
foreign oil to abundant domestic resources; 
and eventually providing an essentially inex­ 
haustible source of energy. The historical 
partnership between the Federal Government and 
industry in developing nuclear technology, in­ 
cluding the reasons for decline in the last 
five years, is described. Recent changes in 
Federal policies and programs designed to en­ 
able increased use of nuclear power are re­ 
viewed. But the outlook will remain uncertain 
for the near term until public confidence is 
restored.
1. The Role of Nuclear Energy
In recent years, nuclear power has provided 
essential electricity through four major dis­ 
ruptions of energy supply; the 1973-74 Middle 
East oil embargo, the natural gas shortage of 
1976-77, the national coal strike of 1978, and 
the shortages attendant to the upheavals in 
Iran in 1979. It is widely accepted that coal 
and nuclear power are the only viable signifi­ 
cant sources of electricity available through 
the end of this century and the first decades 
of the next. And electricity is one of the 
domestic sources of energy that must be expand­ 
ed to maintain a healthy, growing economy. 
Moreover, the nation must continue an orderly 
transition from an economy dependent on oil to 
one that is fueled by diversified and secure 
energy sources.
Here is how nuclear power contributes to this 
transition now:
• It enables electric utilities to economic­ 
ally displace oil and gas burning base load 
power plants. In 1981 three million barrels 
of oil and gas were consumed daily by elec­ 
tric utilities, much of it imported from 
insecure foreign sources. The U.S., in 
contrast, has vast uranium resources.
• It enables electricity to be substituted 
for oil consumption in all end use sectors 
of the economy. Electrification has al­ 
ready occurred in residential and commercial 
space heating, industrial processes, and 
private vehicles and light duty tracks. 
And the additional potential is high.
t It enables more of the nation's coal re­ 
sources to be used for the production of 
synthetic fuels, industrial applications 
and export.
In order to eliminate our overdependence on 
oil we must orchestrate two transitions; 
firstly to move toward abundant domestic 
sources, and secondly toward renewable or 
essentially inexhaustible sources as these 
technologies are developed.
The full potential of the fission energy con­ 
tribution to electrical energy supply can 
facilitate both these transitions, the first 
in the ways just discussed, and the second 
through the development of the fast breeder 
reactor. As you know, development of the 
breeder reactor will allow us to realize 60 
times more energy from our uranium resources 
than currently deployed light water reactors 
(LWR). Thus, the complete fission energy 
system includes the following four elements:' 
the current LWR fuel cycle; LWR spent fuel 
reprocessing (to supply plutonium for the 
breeder reactor); the fast breeder reactor 
fuel cycle; and immobilization and disposal 
of high level wastes.
2. The.Past
This four component nuclear strategy was recog­ 
nized in the earliest days of the U.S. nuclear 
program. Unlike many other technologies that 
originated in the private sector, nuclear tech­ 
nology was created and fostered by the Federal 
Government as an outgrowth of its wartime 
weapons related program. Civilian nuclear 
power developed under controlled conditions by 
a Federal policy that fostered a commercial 
industry to exploit nuclear technology. By
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1971 this national policy had evolved to where 
the industry had announced plans for over 170 
nuclear power plants, 30 were already in oper­ 
ation, and nuclear fuel had been transferred 
to private ownership. The Atomic Energy Com­ 
mission (AEC) offered to assist the industry 
develop reprocessing of spent fuel and recycle 
of plutonium, and took the initiative in es­ 
tablishing repositories for long term storage 
of radioactive waste. The "Atoms for Peace" 
program of assistance to other nations with 
nuclear technology under international safe­ 
guards was in full swing.
Ten years later, in 1981, the picture is in 
stark contrast. The nation's nuclear indus­ 
trial capability is eroding and the current 
base of operating plants and plants under 
construction is shrinking. Today there are 
some 73 plants operating and 90 plants at 
various stages of construction. Since 1976 
more than 50 plants have been cancelled and 
there is a defacto moratorium on construction 
permits. This has come about through a com­ 
bination of regulatory, financial and his­ 
torical factors including a reduction in real 
demand growth since the oil embargo and a 
corresponding reduction in projected future 
needs. An institutional paralysis set "in. 
Commercial reprocessing has been unsuccessful 
in 2 of 3 attempts for many of the same reasons. 
The Federal Government failed to fulfill its 
responsibility to provide timely disposal ser­ 
vices for high level nuclear wastes. The 
breeder program was off the tracks. The U.S. 
Government became perceived as an unreliable 
partner with industry and an unreliable sup­ 
plier of nuclear technology abroad.
What happened? Why? Should anything be done; 
and if so, what? What is the Government doing? 
Are things any better now, how do they look 
for the future? Let's take a look at answers 
to some of these questions.
3. The Present and The Future
Should anything be done? Emphatically, yes! 
It turns out that coal plants are also being 
cancelled by utilities; what appears at stake 
is not simply the absence of orders for nuclear 
power plants but the very future of the 
nation's electricity supply. Some numbers may 
help provide perspective.
An overview of electric generation capacity 
shows that in 1980 some 600 GWe* existed, some 
100 GWe oil-fired, some 100 GWe of pre-1950 
vintage and about half of which could be re­ 
tired by 2000. Peak load in 1980 was about 
440 GWe indicating an average reserve margin of 
30% in contrast to the historically suggested 
norm of 20%.
*1 GWe = 10 watts of electricity.
A 3.3'% annual growth rate in peak load (less 
than is forecast by the electric industry and 
less than needed to sustain the economic 
growth rates called for by the Reagan Admin­ 
istration) would double the peak load in 2000 
to 880 GWe. Including a 20% reserve margin 
and 50 GWe of retirements means that some 500 
GWe capacity needs to be added by 2000.
In fact about 230 GWe of coal and nuclear 
capacity are in the pipeline, so another 270 
GWe has to be ordered between now and 2000. 
Some should be ordered now to avoid dangerous­ 
ly low reserve margins in the late 1980's and 
the last must be ordered within 10 years under 
current assumptions for construction and 
licensing. But utilities are continuing to 
cancel current projects much less contemplate 
adding new ones.
Clearly, to maintain our expectations for 
economic growth and the increasing dependence 
that we anticipate on electricity, something 
must be done. To understand what and how we 
must understand what went wrong.
What happened and why? A lot of things, for 
complicated and interrelated reasons. The oil 
embargo of 1973-74 and subsequent rise in 
prices were in turn followed by reduced demand 
and high inflation. An industry previously 
used to 7% annual increases in electrical 
demand was suddenly faced with growth rates 
more like 3% and large uncertainties in fore­ 
casting. Some projects were stretched out, 
some cancelled. From a project standpoint, a 
stretch-out will always mean the plant is more 
expensive when completed, and in an era of 
inflation, much more expensive. High infla­ 
tion, as well as regulatory factors, caused 
construction costs to soar for both coal and 
nuclear plants. Even so when oil costs in­ 
creased to $30/barrel in 1979, it became 
cheaper to build and operate new coal and 
nuclear plants than to continue to operate 
existing oil plants. In addition, utilities, 
among the most regulated of industries, are 
faced with backward looking rate regulation 
that considers historical rather than current 
costs so that allowed rate increases nowhere 
near covered the increased and rapidly in­ 
flating costs incurred for construction pro­ 
jects. The utilities are the most capital- 
intensive industry in the country (more than 
20% of all capital in 1979) so they must fre­ 
quently go to the financial markets, markets 
that in 1979 after the Three Mile Island 
accident realized the financial risk a nuclear 
plant can represent to the utility. All of 
this has resulted in a serious and rapid de­ 
cline in the financial health of the utility 
industry. In order to try to maintain finan­ 
cial stability and regain financial health, 
utilities are cancelling expensive construction 
projects and avoiding commitments to future 
construction.
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Practical problems in designing, constructing, 
testing, operating and maintaining the newly 
ordered plants began to occur. Problems 
typical of the early evolution of new tech­ 
nology but which are amenable to a disciplined 
engineering approach. These problems were not 
public health problems but they became caught 
up in a regulatory process that grew to be 
prescriptive and a disincentive to prompt 
solutions. When the Nuclear Regulatory Com­ 
mission (NRC) was statutorily formed in 1974, 
the process of licensing and regulation of 
nuclear power plants steadily became more com­ 
plex, changeable with time and time-consuming. 
Those committed to stopping nuclear power 
found the new procedures afforded ample oppor­ 
tunity to force delays and postponements. In 
fact, the regulatory focus shifted more and 
more to highly improbable accident scenarios 
and prescriptive solutions, thus deflecting 
attention from solving day-to-day reliability 
problems. According to the Kemeny Commission, 
this was an underlying cause of the circum­ 
stances that led to the Three Mile Island 
accident.
In short, nuclear power became entangled in a 
regulatory web that did not enhance safety 
but causes extensive delays, increased costs 
(a 4 year delay in operation can add one 
billion dollars in capital costs to a nuclear 
plant today), and even raises the possibility 
that an operator cannot ever bring his hard- 
won and expensive plant on line.
These problems, the failure of the Government 
to come through on waste management, the pre­ 
vious Administrations 1 commitment to nuclear 
as an energy source of last resort, and the 
creation of public fears in spite of the demon­ 
strated safety record of nuclear power plants 
all caused the public to lose confidence in 
nuclear power and in the leadership of its 
institutions. The message on the safety, eco­ 
nomic and environmental benefits of nuclear 
power as compared to alternatives has not got 
through clearly enough.
Finally, the Government's commitment to repro­ 
cessing was withdrawn and became much less 
enthusiastic for the fast breeder. One reason 
given was the concern for the spread of nuclear 
weapons. Reprocessing spent fuel yields plu- 
tonium, a weapons usable material. It was 
thought that avoidance of domestic reprocessing 
(as opposed to export) would reduce the likeli­ 
hood of foreign proliferation. This policy 
did not lead to the reversal of national pro­ 
grams on reprocessing or the fast breeder.
What is the Government doing now? A lot that 
Is different from a year ago!Policies have 
changed significantly and programs are taking 
new direction and momentum that appear to be 
directed at the causes of what previously went
wrong. It appears that the Administration has 
taken a look at the role nuclear energy can 
play in the transitions to a secure and essen­ 
tially inexhaustible energy supply I mentioned 
earlier and has decided to reinstate the orig­ 
inal four component nuclear strategy.
The new national energy policy plan was re­ 
leased in mid 1981. It stressed that the 
Government would no longer have a prescriptive 
energy development plan but rather rely on 
market forces and the private sector. Nuclear 
power was to be allowed to compete fairly in 
the market place again in contrast to the pre­ 
vious era of not-so-benign neglect. The 
stress was also on energy supply in recogni­ 
tion of the American people's rejection of a 
policy of settling for less.
In October 1981 a long-awaited nuclear energy 
policy statement was released in which the 
following policy initiatives appeared:
• A commitment was made to improve the regu­ 
latory and licensing process with an ob­ 
jective of reducing what now takes 10-14 
years to the 6-8 years typical in countries 
like Japan and France.
• Government agencies were directed to pro­ 
ceed to demonstrate breeder reactor tech­ 
nology and complete the Clinch River 
Breeder Reactor (CRBR).
• The indefinite ban on reprocessing by com­ 
mercial interests was lifted.
• The secretary of energy was instructed to 
work with industry and state governments 
to proceed swiftly toward deployment of 
means of high level radioactive waste 
disposal and storage.
• A report on the obstacles to the increased 
use of nuclear energy was required by 
September 30, 1982.
Not everyone was pleased, of course. The 
industry, while welcoming the sea change in 
atmosphere, was disappointed at the lack of 
government funds to support the demonstration 
of reprocessing, the lack of commitment to 
away-from-reactor spent fuel storage, and 
felt that it should take much less than a 
year to report on obstacles that most felt 
were clear enough at the time. Opponents 
spoke of the unequal budgetary treatment of 
nuclear r&d compared to the fate of almost all 
non-nuclear government-supported r&d. Others 
were concerned that the wrong signals were 
being sent on non-proliferation.
The rhetoric on reprocessing and the breeder 
not withstanding, the change in nuclear non- 
proliferation policy (on which a statement was
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released in mid 1981) from that of the previous 
Administration's position at the end of its 
term is not great. The fact is that avoidance 
of nuclear weapons proliferation overseas has 
always been a top priority policy of the 
Government actively supported by the AEC (and 
its successors) and the Congress. Export con­ 
trols have been and continue to be a principal 
vehicle. The new policy does contain an expli­ 
cit provision to reestablish the U.S. as a pre­ 
dictable and reliable partner for peaceful 
nuclear cooperation.
My perception is that the Department of Energy 
has significantly altered its programs in res­ 
ponse to the policy changes in the following 
ways. In general, the Department's strategy 
seems to derive from the historic Federal role 
for energy technologies to provide an appro­ 
priate climate for private sector activities; 
by sharing risks when the national interest is 
served, and by providing research, development 
and demonstration support complementary to that 
of industry for technologies that are judged 
outside the range of normal industry risk- 
taking. Some think the Department and the 
Office of Management and Budget have not accur­ 
ately interpreted the latter.
The waste program has been re-focussed oh find­ 
ing three sites for exploration as a possible 
location for a test and evaluation facility; 
the final choice of site is to be made by the 
middle of the decade. Emplacement of waste 
in this facility would begin before the end 
of the decade, as would submittal to NRC of a 
license application for a repository. Program 
costs are in large part to be covered by prior 
collection of fees from industry. Essential 
supportive legislation has not yet been passed 
but is reported much closer than ever before.
The Department has been searching for ways to 
foster a climate in which the private sector 
would again invest in reprocessing. A number 
of approaches have been considered such as a 
COMSAT-like institution, but so far without 
apparent success. Electric utilities are at 
best disinterested. The greatest stumbling 
block appears to be that the Administration 
has not yet found a way to come to grips with 
the fact that the private sector needs and 
warrants protection against just the kind of 
Government policy changes that have occurred 
in this area over the last 5 years. These 
changes constitute nonbusiness risks.
The Department is seeking to accelerate the 
CRBR and hopes to break ground in March, 1982 
dependent on favorable NRC action and to 
achieve criticality before the end of the 
decade. It hopes to begin the commercializa­ 
tion process by obtaining industry financial 
commitment to the next large developmental 
plant of about 1000 MWe.
Changes to licensing regulations are reported 
to be sent to the Vice President's Task Force 
on Regulatory Relief by early 1982. A nuclear 
power public information program is reportedly 
in the mill, something that was actively dis­ 
couraged and discontinued under the previous 
Administration.
Finally, the Department is addressing the 
matter of obstacles and, of course, what alter­ 
natives there are to dealing with them. A 
big problem here is finding a politically pala­ 
table Federal role.
The obstacle list looks something like this:
• Uncertain future demand for electricity.
t Lack of national commitment to nuclear 
energy.
• Uncertainty about Federal policy for radio­ 
active waste management, use of reprocessing 
and fast breeder reactors.
t Regulatory and licensing uncertainties in­ 
cluding expensive schedule delays for 
retrofits.
t Discontinuities between utility planning 
horizons that cover whole regions and span 
ten years and regulatory horizons that 
usually cover individual states and span 
only a few years.
• Rate regulation that covers historical not 
current costs.
• An incentive structure in which benefits 
accrue to rate-payers and risks to stock­ 
holders.
The initiatives and programs already discussed 
aim at many of these and there are other re­ 
medies that focus on one component or another 
on this obstacle course. They include: re­ 
gional regulation; deregulation; increased 
public ownership; diversification or horizontal 
integration; longer commission terms; and 
repeal of laws that affect utilities like the 
Public Utility Holding Act, sections of the 
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act and 
of the National Energy Conservation Policy Act. 
All of these one can expect the Government to 
study.
Important considerations are that a package of a 
policy instruments (no one instrument can have 
the necessary scope) that improves the ability 
of utilities to invest in new electric genera­ 
tion must do so by simultaneously improving 
the financial bottom line of the utility, its 
capital formation ability, and by providing 
an adequate return on investment* Many of the 
measures put forward so far do not meet all
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three requirements; some in fact simply mini­ 
mize near-term financial losses and either ig­ 
nore the long term or may be harmful in the long 
term. Moreover, it is well to remember that the 
patient is not always the most reliable source 
on effective remedies. It was the Savings and 
Loan industry itself that came up with All 
Savers Certificates on which they must pay high 
interest to people who save in the short term; 
a so-called remedy for their problem of re­ 
ceiving low interest payments on long term 
mortgages. As a result of this ill-conceived 
legislation, the Federal Government is having 
to bail them out. The investment decision 
process within the utility industry has changed 
with all the financial problems it faces. In 
order for the Government to impact investment 
decisions in new generation equipment, it must 
first understand the forecasting and decision 
processes the industry uses.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 provides 
for tax deferral on reinvested stock dividends, 
accelerated capital cost recovery on plants put 
in service after 1980, and the trading of cash 
for investment tax credits through leverage 
leasing. But it will surely not be a remedy 
for all the industry's financial ills. While 
the Economic Recovery Program as a whole, if 
it works, should do much to improve the picture 
by reducing inflation and interest rates there 
are many who think that more is needed.
What is certain is that there are many and di­ 
verse interested parties to be considered and 
that consensus will be hard to come by. What 
one certainly hopes is that the Federal Govern­ 
ment will exercise the necessary leadership or 
catalyst role to come to closure rapidly.
Are things better now, how do they look for 
the future? Yes and no, full of hope but not 
great expectation! The fact is that we're in 
a recession, so the short term still looks 
bleak. A lot of things have been done by the 
industry and the Government that are essential 
if things are to improve. And as Deputy 
Secretary of Energy Davis said recently: "It's 
rather hard to overcome within a few months 
the rather dedicated work of a number of people 
over several years to screw the business up." 
But key things remain to be done. Two of the 
most important are ensuring there is adequate 
storage for spent fuel and clearing the impasse 
at Three Mile Island. Utility operators face 
the prospect of shutting down power plants as 
their storage facilities fill up, some as early 
as the mid-1980's. Some utilities have pro­ 
vided for increased capacity at existing sites, 
and some are counting on shipping spent fuel 
from one reactor to the storage facility at 
another reactor that has capacity available. 
Many contend that the Administration must re­ 
store support for interim storage at away-from- 
reactor facilities. Clearly there is uncer­
tainty about the problem that must be resolved.
Three years after the accident at Three Mile 
Island, clean-up has barely begun. It is 
difficult to summarize the series of delays, 
false starts and roadblocks the utility has 
had to contend with. Resolving the situation 
rapidly was recognized early as being in the 
interest of all parties, the entire industry, 
the utility, state and local government, the 
residents, and the Federal Government. The 
most important remaining issue is how to 
finance the estimated one billion dollar 
clean-up costs, costs that will escalate 
with every month of delay. A complex arrange­ 
ment initiated by Pennsylvania Governor 
Thornburgh has come close to success involving 
the utility's rate commission, contributions 
from the industry (but that requires legisla­ 
tion in the Congress) state taxes and the 
Federal Government. But the key to the plan 
were the revenues expected from re-starting 
Unit 1 at Three Mile Island very soon. Recently 
those prospects dimmed. It is urgent that 
this situation be resolved.
In summary, the atmosphere is better, the 
Administration is much more supportive and 
the Congress is probably less negative. But 
there are still a lot of people in Congress 
who would rather not see nuclear succeed and 
much of what the Administration is trying to 
do programmatically does depend on successful 
legislation. And the public? The public has 
not yet made up its mind and until it sees real 
progress on waste management and a resolution 
at Three Mile Island it probably won't. That 
is where our leaders must concentrate their 
efforts.
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